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Abstract
This paper uses state-level variation in the implementation of the 73rd amendment in
India to observe the relationship between political reservations for women in local
government and female child mortality. Nationally, reservations for women are not
associated with a statistically significant difference in female child mortality. However, a
state by state analysis shows variations in the level of impact of reservations on the topic
of female child mortality. This paper examines the constraints on female representatives
and their level of effectiveness in executing pro-female policies given the political and
social environment. The two case studies on Kerala and Haryana explore women office
holder’s abilities to administer public goods that favor women and children and the
subsequent impact on female child mortality.

Introduction
A number of governments around the world have attempted to increase social
development through the decentralization of power to local bodies. (The World Bank
Report, 2001) A facet of this phenomenon includes the provision of representation of
minorities and disadvantaged groups through reservations or quotas. This includes giving
vulnerable groups a voice in decision-making and ideally improving the targeting of
developmental programs. The World Bank claims that a greater number of women in
government results in increased benefits for women and children. (The World Bank
Report, 2001) One of the outcomes commonly tied to female empowerment is female
child mortality. (Ram, 2010) This paper analyzes whether the staggered implementation
of the 73rd amendment in states between 1987-2007 and the subsequent increase in
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women office-holders in India’s panchayats results in the execution of pro-female
initiatives to affect female child mortality. This depends on whether local women leaders
in India embody descriptive representation or substantive representation. The former
focuses on actors’ characteristics, what they are, concentrating “on being something
rather than doing something.” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 61) The latter is when actors advocate
their constituents’ interests and make policy decisions that benefit one group or another
among their clientele. (Mosher, 1968) For example, substantive representation would
encompass women in government helping female children through cash transfers,
increased access to education, or laws to improve the status of females in society. In
India, excess female child mortality stems from a high son preference due to economic
and social factors. This problem spans regions, religions, and socio-economic levels and
is a developmental priority in the country. This paper focuses on the impact of women
leaders on this development indicator and contributes to the literature on the impact of
female representation in India. It is unique in its use of female child mortality as a proxy
to fill the gap between descriptive and substantive representation of women in India.
Additionally, the policy juxtaposition of two different states helps to further analyze the
particular state-level differences in female representation and female child mortality. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 sets a historical background for
the paper and introduces the 73rd amendment and India’s problem with female child
mortality. Section 2 describes the relevant literature on the topic of female representation
in India. Section 3 presents the data and explains the empirical strategy. Section 4
describes the national level data and discusses the results and Section 5 describes statelevel data and analyzes policies in specific case study states. Section 6 concludes.
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1. Background: India’s 73rd Amendment and Female Child Mortality
1.1 The 73rd Amendment and Women’s Representation in India
The passage of the 73rd amendment (Panchayati Raj) in 1993 in India has been acclaimed
as an important step in the devolution of power to local governments. It established local
governance at the rural level and local bodies at the village (panchayat), intermediate, and
district levels with mandatory direct elections every five years. (Kalsi, 2017) The
amendment was intended to further the administration of development programs at the
local level and improve the efficiency of resource distribution through the process of
decentralization. Additionally, the amendment mandated panchayats to have at least 33%
reservation for women in the council and leadership as well as reservations for scheduled
castes and tribes1. (Mohanty, 1995) Candidates for reserved seats would have to be
nominated by their political parties and would also go through the process of campaigns
and elections. (Duflo, 2004) The amendment required reservations to be randomly
assigned to panchayats based on their serial registration number and female chairperson
reservations to be rotated between panchayats every election cycle. (Mohanty, 1995)
The idea for this decentralization and women’s representation at the grassroots
level came to fruition because of the failure of the panchayats to be effective
administrators of public service in decreasing poverty and inequality before the 1990s.
(Chaudhuri, 2003) The Indian Constitution included panchayats at its founding, but
elections at this level were rare and the local level had no power of policy
implementation. In most states, other than West Bengal, local elections had not been held
regularly. Many elections were delayed either by non-governmental groups or by the

1

Scheduled castes and tribes- groups of historically disadvantaged people in India (often seen as
“untouchable”) and part of the lowest social sectors of Indian society (Duflo, 2012).

Sharma 6
state government due to reasons such as civil unrest or natural disasters. (Duflo, 2004)
There was a home-grown consensus of politicians and elites from either side of the
political spectrum around the failure of the centralized strategy of the Indian
developmental state. (Jain, 1996) Currently, even with the national decentralization to
local governments, the level of power given to each local government varies and is
dependent on the political characteristics of each state. (Chaudhuri, 2003) For example,
in Haryana, the state bureaucracy continues to withhold funds from local governments
and obstructs the implementation of local programs. (Chaudhuri, 2003) Though the
amendment allows local governments to administer their own programs, this looks
different in various states and has an effect on panchayats’ level of impact on the initial
goal of furthering social development.
The top-down approach of the 73rd amendment highlighted the Indian
government’s need for development at the local level and its acknowledgment of the
failure of current programs to improve rural lives. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
spearheaded the passage of the amendment and gave a speech in 1989 to promote a
resurgence of focus on the Panchayati Raj. In this speech, he urged decentralization in
order to strengthen democracy at all levels of government and for power to be given to
the people instead of the elite power brokers. He defined these power brokers as the rich
and those who derive power from the caste structure2. He argued that “We are on the
threshold of a mighty revolution...It is a revolution that will bring democracy to the
doorsteps of crores of Indians.” (Gandhi, 1989, p.2) Additionally, he wanted to pay
special attention to women and scheduled castes, which he described as “the weaker

2

Caste structure- A system that divides Hindus into hierarchical groups and has strict social implications.
(What is India’s Caste System)
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sections of society.” (Gandhi, 1989, p.2) Gandhi and other elites in power made the case
that centralization was leading to the delayed implementation of programs on the ground,
impeding economic development, and decreasing the effectiveness of poverty reduction.
(Gandhi, 1989) The fact that the amendment was spearheaded by elites in parliament was
beneficial because it was legitimized and had powerful national backing. However, there
was no grassroots movement pushing for effective administration so states began
implementation at different times and to different levels. Additionally, the lack of a
grassroots movement meant that there was no ground-level push for substantive
representation. Even though elites like Gandhi wanted to help the “weaker sections of
society,” it was hard to hold them accountable for the implementation of concrete change.
Therefore, it is helpful to test women’s abilities to participate effectively in order to
analyze the level of true decentralization and empowerment of underrepresented groups
initially promised by these elites.
The national government used the 73rd amendment to revitalize local government
and target development with reservations and decentralization. Proponents of the
amendment realized biased perceptions deter socially disadvantaged groups from
breaking into politics without any affirmative action policies, thus making reservations an
important part of the new amendment. (Duflo, 2012) Reservations for women are
important because men and women have different preferences, which result in a different
allocation of public goods. Minority groups, like women, are likely to provide minority or
low spillover goods such as transfers, rations, and water connections, which only benefit
other women. (Duflo, 2004) The majority of men do not find any benefit from these
goods and are less likely to invest in them. Without reservations, it is hard for women to
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have representation in government and provide these important minority goods.
Additionally, political parties are less likely to field candidates from disadvantaged
groups because they do not believe that they will win the majority vote. (Duflo, 2004) It
was important for reservations to be included in the amendment in order to target the
development of women and other minorities. As a result, after the first round of elections
between 1993 and 1994, “almost 800,000 women were brought into local politics” in a
country with no prior history of that level of women’s political participation. (Kalsi,
2017, p.34) This thesis uses the fact that the legislation was implemented at varying dates
across Indian states in order to test the effect of increased women’s representation on
female child mortality.

1.2 Female Child Mortality in the Indian Context
Female child mortality is a continuing problem throughout India’s history and acts as an
impediment to development and gender equality. Due to economic, social, and cultural
norms, India is known to have a preference for boys, which results in a lower proportion
of females ages 0-4 in relation to males. The main reason for this male preference is
based on the economic benefits of having a son and the costs of having a daughter. In
India, there is no social security system so parents look to their sons to ensure their
futures and care for them in their old age. (Sen, 1990) Daughters are liabilities because
they have to leave to another family once they are married and cannot take care of their
parents. Additionally, they do not contribute economically to the family wealth and are
costly because of the dowry system3. Sons are also able to pass down the family name

Dowry system- The bride’s family must give the groom’s family cash, goods, or property as a condition
for marriage (Sen, 1990)
3
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and inherit family property and thus are assets both socially and economically. (Sen,
1990) Overall, there has been a decline in fertility, but a rise in son preference, with
various differences across regions and geographies in the nation. (Basu, 1999) This
affects the female child in multiple aspects and can come into play in feticide rates,
infanticide rates, and lack of access to basic facilities for young girls. Given similar
health and nutrition, women are expected to live longer than men so the sex ratio should
indicate more females than males at any age group. (Sen, 1990) However, the overall sex
ratio in India has always been highly skewed in favor of men because most women and
female children are not provided with the same level of care. (Premi, 2001) Since the rise
of technology in the 2000s, there has been a decrease in female child mortality, but an
increase in the overall child sex ratio, which can only be explained by an increase in
prenatal sex selection. (Duflo, 2004) Technologies like the ultrasound and abortion
methods have made it cheaper and more accessible for families to end an unwanted
pregnancies. Although abortions are illegal in India, there are many black market clinics
that people can use if they are able to afford them. These technologies allow families
easier access to choosing the sex of the child in utero and are the catalyst for the
substitution effect from postnatal to prenatal sex selection. (Duflo, 2012) Sex selection
and child mortality are different indicators of the same topic of gender discrimination and
are both important to understand in order to achieve the overarching goal of gender
equality.

2. A Gender Perspective on Politics: Political Reservation and Women’s Impacts on
Policy-Making
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2.1 Political Reservations in Panchayati Raj
A number of studies have examined the costs and benefits of political reservations for
disadvantaged groups, especially women. Many studies have seen great positive impacts
of women’s reservations, while others have noticed unintended consequences such as a
backlash against women in power. Even if there are women in government, the intended
effect of the reservations to improve development for women, children, and society may
not appear due to these negative unintended consequences. Therefore, it is important to
test the impact of reservations to see their true effects in different contexts.
True equality would encompass a 50/50 ratio of men to women in government,
but that is not true in many countries, including India, so there must be a mechanism to
head in that direction. Over the period 1985-2007, “only 5.5% of state legislators in India
on average were women” because there are many impediments to entering politics
without reservations. (Iyer, 2012, p.8) The Goldberg paradigm explains how people of
both sexes are more likely to rate someone’s work as lower quality if they think the
person is a woman. (Pande, 2012) Consequently, in politics, some people vote for men
because they associate them with higher quality candidates due to long-standing gender
norms of what characteristics a leader should possess. Schlozman, Burns, and Verba
argue that the gender gap in politics is due to the income gap and men can enter politics
because they have the resources and abilities to do so. (Burns, 2001) Constantini argues
that it is due to women’s general lack of political ambition and that women would rather
take up other roles at home or in NGOs than enter the political scene. (Pande, 2012)
There is a high cost of entry for women, which is accompanied with lower relative
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benefits. They are often ridiculed and shamed and have a hard time passing their own
policies in a patriarchal society. (Pande, 2012)
In India, reserved seats are kept for female candidates and allow for the direct
regulation of the number of women in government. Those who are against the quota
argue that these reservations crowd out other groups who are equally or more qualified to
be in power. Reservations can be costly to society because potential women candidates
are often less educated, have less experience and are less ambitious. (Pande, 2012)
Lastly, these quotas may cause a social and political backlash of voters against women if
people do not think that they deserve these seats. (Pande, 2012) Zipp and Plutzer also
mention how strong female candidates win votes, while weak ones do not and it is more
important to have an overall strong candidate than to regard their gender. (Zipp, 1985)
Pro-quota advocates argue that reservations improve women’s representation so
that they can have a say in politics. (Whitford, 2007) Men may not understand women’s
basic needs and their policies will reflect men’s own preferences. If a percent of the
population is not represented in government, its voice will not be heard and its
preferences will not be prioritized. (Hirshman, 1970) However, Goldberg finds that the
aforementioned taste discrimination against women decreases after two election cycles
and this may reduce the need for quotas in the future. (Pande, 2012) This bias decreases
over time and with increased exposure to female leaders, but it does not completely go
away because of deeply ingrained male candidate preference. (Pande, 2012)
Consequently, reduced discrimination makes backlash against women leaders obsolete in
the long run. Also, women in power may have a role model effect on the aspirations of
other women and this can create a cycle of more women entering into politics. (Beaman,
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2012) Beaman observes that exposure to female leaders causes more parents to send their
daughters to school and value education over housework. (Beaman, 2012) Increased
political representation of women through reservations has a long term effect on women’s
empowerment and gender bias reduction.

2.2 The Impact of Women Office-Holders
In India, women were brought into government with the goals of decreasing gender bias
and targeting female development at the local level. This thesis analyzes the effects of
political reservations for women on increasing their level of substantive representation in
politics. In order to do this, I use changes in female child mortality rates as a proxy for
women successfully or unsuccessfully applying pro-female policies in panchayats. Three
main schools of thought surround the election of women office-holders and their political
impact on human development and specifically pro-female policy preferences. This thesis
uses Adrienne Smith’s definition of pro-female policies as “those that (a) improve
women’s social, political, and economic status in relation to men, (b) address women’s
unique needs related to their bodies and health, and/or (c) concern women’s traditional
role as caregivers.” (Smith, 2014, p. 6)
The first theory argues that women representatives do not actively pass profemale policies either due to cultural and social obstacles, structural impediments, or their
own choices. (Mohanty, 1995) The Downsian model argues that a two-party, or in this
case two-gender, system should converge to one platform for policies and a majority rule
system will result in the outcome most preferred by the median voter. (Downs, 1957) In
this case, the median voter in India is a male so candidates are more likely to pass
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policies that benefit men. However, this theorem does not account for minority leaders
refocusing policies on their own minority group once they are elected and do not need the
majority vote. According to the political Coase Theorem, in the absence of transaction
costs, “agents should agree to execute efficient policies regardless of the distribution of
bargaining power among them.” (Galiani, 2014, p.14) Even if the reservation policy
increases women’s bargaining power, the efficient policy choices will still be made and
gender will not matter in the long run. This means that pro-female policies will only pass
if they are effective, but will not be stressed by women office-holders if they are
ineffective. Prasad also argues that women in India have more structural impediments in
political positions due to familial and societal expectations, lack of access to training and
experience, constituent stereotypes of gender roles, and low support from male
colleagues. (Prasad 2009) Additionally, Manikyamba reports that women will be
“unsexed” by participating in government and will have to embody primarily male
characteristics in order to be taken seriously. (Manikyamba 1986) Due to deeply
ingrained gender norms, people tend to value and vote for stereotypical male leaders.
This does not leave much room for women to pass pro-female policies or advocate for the
support of other women.
A number of other studies make the argument that women in government hurt
human development as a whole and pass policies that adversely affect certain groups.
These theorists argue that women lack experience, education, and ambition when
compared to men. (Dhaliwal, 2011) Dhaliwal finds that cash transfers to girls in India
come at the direct expense of boys because the money is not spent on benefitting both
genders, such as hiring new teachers or deworming everyone. (Dhaliwal, 2011) Bardhan
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also finds that women panchayat leaders negatively affect public goods targeting of
SC/ST groups. (Bardhan, 2009) However, this is only because they are not ingrained in
the same capture clientelism networks as men. (Bardhan, 2009) Beaman also finds that
after their second terms in office, females are even more likely than males to provide both
male and female public goods. (Beaman, 2012) Additionally, Ban and Rao find that the
difference between male and female experience in government disappears once females
gain 1.3 terms of experience, thereby disproving the theory that females will always
remain less competent than males. (Ban, 2008) Lastly, the human development theory
argues that having women in political positions is an end goal in itself and simply their
involvement raises the development and equality of society as a whole. (Sen, 2001)
Consequently, the idea that women policy makers hurt society lacks explanatory value in
the long run and it is apparent that they are more likely to support general development
goals.
The last theory argues that women policy makers are more likely to consider the
social good and provide a greater number of public goods and services for women.
(Revenga, 2012) Beaman argues that women office-holders value certain public goods
that tend to improve the lives of women and children such as water access, transfers, and
rations. (Beaman, 2012) Male politicians are less likely to invest in these low spillover
goods because they mainly target women and do not cater to the majority of voters.
(Beaman, 2012) According to the non-unitary model of households, men and women tend
to have different preferences, which are showcased based on the breakdown of
bargaining power between household members. (Rode, 2011) If women gain more
bargaining power in the household or in politics, they will better be able to pursue their
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preferences. Additionally, studies show that women leaders are more responsive to
women’s complaints because their preferences tend to align more closely and this is
reflected in their policy-making. (Beaman, 2012) For example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo
find that in West Bengal women complain more about water and roads and the women
politicians invest more in those issues. In Rajasthan, where women complain more often
about drinking water, women politicians invest more in water and less in roads.
(Chattopadhyay, 2001) Additionally, Ghani describes how the increase of women officeholders in India does not affect the overall employment of women in manufacturing but
does cause an increase in more women establishing work in the informal sector. (Ghani,
2014) Women leaders lower the cost of entrepreneurship of women by providing public
goods and infrastructure and also inspiring women to start their own businesses. (Ghani,
2014) In this case, increasing women’s representation does not have the intended effect,
but creates unintentional change in another sector. It is therefore vital to observe both the
intended and unintented consequences of women’s reservations in order to understand
their total impact. Another hypothesis argues that increased female representation helps
to specifically reduce female child mortality. This can be through the improvement of
overall health care and survival rates for girls or by specifically targeting female child
mortality. (Kalsi, 2017) However, women leaders may focus on empowering women
through increasing access to abortion and contraceptives. Though this is “pro-female”, it
may have the unintended consequence of increasing female sex selection. Although this
thesis uses female child mortality and not female sex selection as the dependent variable,
it is important to observe the unintended consequences of women’s representation on
both of these topics. This thesis focuses on filling the gap between these conflicting
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theories and coming to a conclusion about whether or not a greater representation of
women in government decreases female child mortality. Current literature is varied on
the subject and does not analyze the reason behind the differences between states. This
thesis will focus on the national and state effects of the 73rd amendment on female child
mortality as a result of increased descriptive representation of women at the local level.

3. Data and Methods
3.1 Methodology
This research focuses on an empirical, analytical, and expository approach to addressing
the research question of whether the passing of the 73rd amendment and the subsequent
increase in women office-holders in India’s panchayats results in the implementation of
pro-female policies and a shift in female child mortality rates. I operationalize the
variable of the implementation of pro-female policies by looking specifically at the
impact of women’s reservations on the proxy variable of female child mortality. There is
a lack of available data on panchayat level policies passed by women leaders and most
women leaders in panchayats are primarily responsible for the implementation of policies
and distribution of funds to various projects. I observe changes in female child mortality
to analyze women leader’s actions in what issues they prioritize and whether or not they
are able to affect “a women’s issue” like female child mortality. I am able to identify the
causal impact of reservations on female child mortality since the reservation status is
randomly rotated among all Gram Panchayats. The empirical strategy is based on
Lakshmi Iyer’s technique of applying state-level variation in the year of implementation
of women’s reservations in India by election date. Some states executed the “not less than

Sharma 17
one-third” political reservation for women before the 1993 amendment, others waited
until the amendment was passed, and the last states did not implement it until the early
2000s4. (Iyer, 2012) The timing of effective implementation is considered to be the first
election in which this quota system was enforced. One reason for the varied timing is that
some states were already in the midst of a political term and had to wait until the next
election cycle to employ the reservations. Additionally, other states began reservations
for women long before the amendment because they knew about the change that was
about to happen. Lastly, a few states had legal problems, budgetary constraints, and
exogenous factors that caused election delays until years later. (Iyer, 2012) Through this
time variation, I conduct a difference by difference estimate on the impact of women’s
representation on a specific human development indicator: female child mortality. Iyer et
al. use this strategy to observe whether state-level implementations of reservations affect
reporting of crimes against women. They found that having female political
representation at the local level creates a strong positive effect on the number of women
willing to report crimes. (Iyer, 2012) This thesis uses a similar strategy to see the effects
of women’s political reservations on the variable of female child mortality. The
dependent variable acts as a proxy for pro-female initiatives and indicates the level of
women’s substantive representation at the local level in India. By observing changes in
female child mortality, I analyze whether local women office-holders are able to
administer policies and distribute funds to pro-female projects. In order to do this, I use a
mixed method approach to analyze both quantitative data and qualitative case studies of
states in India.

4

Table 1: Dates of Panchayati Raj Implementation Across States in India
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3.2 Data Collection and Empirical Strategy
The main independent variable in the set is the date of the first effective election with
women reservations in each state and the dependent variable is female child mortality5.
This data comes from many different sources, which are summarized in the Appendix.
Most of the data for the year of reservations is gathered from the Election Commission of
India and the various State Election Commissions. I also account for other variables that
may inadvertently affect the results such as changes in fertility6, birth rates7, male child
mortality8, population9, Gross Domestic Product10, literacy rates11, and monthly per
capita expenditure12. The main independent and dependent variables are isolated by
accounting for these exogenous variables in the regression model.
I obtained data on these indicators for the period 1987-2007 from various surveys
and datasets created by different offices in the Government of India13 and NGOs. These
include the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, the
Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, The World Bank, and the Reserve Bank of India. The data comes from reports
such as the Sample Registration System Statistical Report, State Human Development
Report, Family Welfare Statistics, District Level Household and Facility Survey, Census

5

Figure 1: Nationwide Trends in Female Child Mortality (1987-2007)
Average number of children born to one woman in a lifetime (Indian Census, 2011)
7
The number of live births per 1000 of population per year (Indian Census, 2011)
6

8

Number of male deaths per 1000 live births of children under 1 year of age (Indian Census, 2011)
Number of people in the state
10
Monetary measure of the market value of all final goods and services produced in that year. This is
calculated using constant prices from 2004-2005 and is written in crores. (Indian Census 2011)
11
Literacy rates- total percentage of the population of an area at a particular time aged seven years or above
who can read and write with understanding. (Indian Census 2011)
9

12

Average per capita expenditure in rupees per person in one month (Indian Census 2011)
These are all included in the Appendix: Data Sources

13
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Reports, Central Statistics Office Reports, Economic Surveys of India, and World Bank
reports. In my regression model, I include year fixed effects to account for changes that
affected all places in a specific year.
Additionally, I control for other factors that may affect female child mortality. I
include whether the Chief Minister in the state was a woman at the time in order to
isolate local level female political participation instead of state-level female
representation. Also, the local governments have women pradhans, or chiefs, during
different election cycles and that might affect policy-making differently than women in
council positions. However, this thesis looks at the overall increase of women and does
not need to specify which position they take in each body of government. Some states
also recently decided to increase the political reservation of women to 50% instead of the
initially required one-third. Some of these states include Bihar, Uttarakhand, Madhya
Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh. (Prasad, 2014) The increase in reservations has no effect
on this thesis because I focus on the initial increase of women with the original passage
of the amendment.
Lastly, I analyze the political and social environment for policymaking in a state
with low gender bias and a state with high gender bias. States such as Haryana and
Punjab historically have high female child mortality rates and others like Kerala have
successfully worked towards decreasing child mortality. (Bose, 2001) I qualitatively
analyze benefits and constraints of the environment for women in each state and the
relationship of these differences to female child mortality.
The empirical strategy provides a multi-faceted approach to the question and
includes both quantitative data and qualitative case studies. The quantitative data is not
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enough by itself because it uses female child mortality as a proxy for women leaders’
ability to further pro-female causes. The case studies further flush out the data and
analyze concrete policy implementation to observe what has and has not changed on a
state level after reservations. It is also important to isolate each main independent and
dependent variable by controlling for exogenous factors that could affect female child
mortality rates. In order to do this, I draw a direct correlation between the timing of the
political reservations, the increase in women office-holders, and the impact on female
child mortality. In order to draw this comparison, I look at multiple datasets over time
and reinforce them with literature that is relevant to the findings. I hypothesize that
women office-holders want to implement pro-female policies and have a positive effect
on female child mortality, but they are constrained by their social and political
environments in reaching their desired outcomes. The final result of women’s
reservations is ambiguous due to these constraints on women, so it is important to test the
results on indicators like female child mortality in order to analyze whether female
office-holders are able to create substantive change in that issue.

3.3 Data: Analysis of the Model
I conduct the analysis for 1514 major states in India over the time frame 1987 to 200715. I
drop states that were excluded from the purview of the amendment16 and others that

14

Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
15
Table 2: Summary Statistics
16
Meghalaya, and Nagaland, Mizoram
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lacked sufficient data17. In order to find the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables, I run state-level regressions of female child mortality rates based on
the year of implementation of the 73rd amendment. The regression equation is the
following:

Mst = as + βt + fRst + d’Xst + εst

The variable Mst is the number of female children (ages 0-4) who died out of the mid
year population of female children in that age group in s state in year t. βt is a fixed effect
for year t, Rst is a dummy variable with 0 and 1 standing for years before and after the
first election with political reservations for women in state s and year t. Xst is a set of
state control variables including population, literacy rates, average MPCE, the presence
of a female chief minister, fertility, and male infant mortality. The coefficient f captures
the effect of political reservations for women on the dependent variable of female child
mortality.
I control for differences between states by accounting for various characteristics
that may affect female child mortality. According to the literature, female child mortality
is affected by variables such as education, economic growth, population, and the general
level of wellbeing. (Iyer, 2012) The variables literacy rates, population, and MPCE
account for these characteristics. (Iyer, 2012) Fertility rates and male mortality account
for whether female child mortality is an isolated problem or whether overall child
mortality is the problem. Lastly, I control for whether the Chief Minister in each state in
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each year was a woman in order to make sure that the political representation for women
at higher levels is not diluting my analysis of political representation of women at the
local level.
The regression itself uses panel data in order to assess the behavior of the
variables across a set of years. It controls for variables that are unobservable or
immeasurable such as cultural factors, differences between states, or variables that
change over time but not across states. The fixed effect of the regression isolates the
impact of the variables over time and accounts for factors within the states or years that
may impact or bias the outcome variable. The fixed effect removes the effect of those
time-invariant characteristics in order to assess the net effect of the predictors on the
outcome variable.

4. National Level Results and Discussion
4.1 National Level Results: Effect of Reservations on Female Child Mortality
I find that political reservations for women in this model do not have a significant impact
on female child mortality rates. Table 3 shows the results of the relationship between
each independent variable and the dependent variable of female child mortality. The
coefficient18 for reservations and female child mortality is small and statistically
insignificant, which shows no important relationship between the year political
reservations were made in each state and the impact on female child mortality.
However, there are correlations between female child mortality and other
variables included in the regression19. It is important to control for these variables
18
19

Coefficient: 0.212
Table 3: Women’s Political Reservations and Female Child Mortality in India

Sharma 23
because they impact female child mortality. Once they are controlled for, it is easier to
see a truer impact of reservations on female child mortality. There is a statistically
significant and negative correlation20 between literacy and female child mortality. As
literacy increases, female child mortality decreases. Additionally, the relationship
between female child mortality and monthly per capita expenditure21 is also significant
and slightly positive. This shows that as people increase their wealth and consumption,
female child mortality also increases. There is also a statistically significant and positive
correlation between fertility and female child mortality22. As people have more children,
there is a greater rate of female child mortality. Lastly, there is a slight positive
correlation between male infant mortality and female child mortality23. Even though this
model does not show any significant relationship between reservations and female child
mortality, it does illustrate correlations between other variables and female child
mortality. This is important in formulating a better idea about the various layers that
affect female child mortality and isolating reservations as the main independent variable
in the analysis.

4.2 Discussion: National Level Substantive Representation of Women
On a national level, the data in this model shows no statistically significant relationship
between reservations for women and female child mortality. However, the data does
show relationships between female child mortality, education, fertility, and economic
growth. There is much discussion on the topic of political reservations and whether they
20

Coefficient: -0.248
Coefficient:0. 0026
22 Coefficient: 1.95
23 Coefficient: 0.26
21
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provide descriptive (women’s presence in politics) or substantive (the active promotion
of women’s interests) representation of women. (Franceschet, 2008) In India, local
women are able to make an impact in the political process with their presence, but have a
hard time producing outcomes on a scale that can impact the national level data in the
context of female child mortality. (Smith, 2014) The model’s results can be explained by
the administrative and environmental constraints that are placed on women leaders in
India as well as their lack of agency in being able to implement and fund significant profemale initiatives. Female child mortality outcomes act as proxies for policy
implementation and indicate the level to which women have the freedom to follow their
preferences. Additionally, the model itself is limited in its scope due to its observance of
state-level data that might dilute the work of women at the local levels. Some women
panchayat leaders are successful in implementing their preferences and others are not
able to accomplish any change. State-level data cannot separate these results and the
work of each individual woman leader is diluted when included with the mass number of
women.
Reservations are expected to provide women with access to a political voice and a
say in how the government is run. However, women’s entry and impact on policies are
often barred by issues such as gender bias, lack of access to basic education and training,
lack of support by family and colleagues, and an unfriendly legal structure. (Chowdhury,
2002) Specifically in India, many women are often reduced to figureheads and are standins for male relatives who make all the decisions. (Nanivadekar, 2006) These quota
women may also be stereotyped as less experienced and less autonomous, which
negatively affects voter’s perceptions. (Franceschet, 2008) Most areas in India are also
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highly patriarchal with male heads of households who do not want to see any change in
the division of labor or gender roles. (Sen, 1990) Consequently, these men do not want
women leaders to have any resources for effective participation that may lead to the
passing of policies that will change the status quo. (Kalsi, 2017) Additionally, 33%
reservation for women at the local level may not be enough to make an impact on data at
the state level. Some women in panchayats may be able to implement pro-female
policies, while others have more constraints and cannot administer their own programs.
Thus the state-level data is highly aggregated and cannot accurately portray the struggles
and successes of every woman panchayat leader. Even with 33% representation, women
are still the minority in government and men are still able to pass policies according to
their own preferences. Additionally, women newly introduced into politics do not have
the same networks and ties to political clientelism that experienced men tend to exploit.
(Bardhan, 2010) Women lack relationships with village elites and district level officials
and are not able to use political contacts to have more of a say in policymaking.
(Bardhan, 2010) It is, however, worth noting that the women’s reservations allow women
to gain self-confidence and for the general voting population to become more receptive
towards women leaders over time. This may lead to women having more of a say in the
future and greater positive targeting impacts in the long run. (Beaman, 2012)
The limited scope for political participation available to women is reflected in the
fact that few women expect to be elected without reservations. (Jafar, 2013) The same
seats are not reserved for every election cycle, so it is hard for women to overcome social
and administrative challenges in order to win the same seat multiple times in a row.
(Jafar, 2013) Thus women leaders are unable to strengthen the networks, skills, and other
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mechanisms needed to develop effective leadership abilities. The analysis is also
muddled by the fact that women leaders may want to increase access to abortion facilities
and contraceptives in order to empower women to make their own choices. This is
technically “pro-female”, but it may result in an increase in female sex selection, which
complicates the analysis on this topic. Prenatal sex selection is different from female
child mortality, but it is important to understand the effects of reservations on both terms
because they are interrelated and part of the same overarching problem of gender
discrimination.
Along with social challenges, women in India also face larger scale administrative
problems. Between 1987 and 2007, there was only an average of 8% women in India’s
National Parliament, which shows a gender bias in higher up political government where
much of the policymaking occurs. (World Bank Data) In terms of Panchayati Raj, India
was a fast track country that implemented quotas almost overnight and did not wait for a
cultural change or push towards equality. Any feminist or grassroots movement did not
accompany the reservations, so there was limited ground-level demand for them to be
implemented in a way that benefitted women rather than the administration in power.
(Nanivadekar, 2006) Additionally, panchayat funding and large policymaking are still
controlled by individual states, which are dominated by males. (Jain, 1996) This leads to
primarily male preferences included in state-level policies, which panchayats have to
implement at the local level. Many panchayats also have committees for various sectors,
but since there are no quotas for committees, they are used as a way of excluding women
from the decision-making process. (Jayal, 2006)
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There also may be limitations with the model itself, which make it hard to see the
direct effect of women’s reservations on female child mortality at the local level. The
data is only available on a state level and may be too aggregated to show an impact of
women’s reservations at the local level. Additionally, there is much literature on women
leaders gaining effectiveness and success in passing policies after two terms in office, but
these reservations are rotational and the data does not focus on the long-term of women
representatives in local bodies. (Beaman, 2012) In the long term, women are known to
become more strategic, form elite networks, and make more informed and experienced
decisions. However, it is hard to see these long-term effects when looking at a small time
period of 20 years. Also, politics in rural India is slow and takes time to have an effect so
the model might have to look at longer periods of female participation to see a shift in its
impact. (Gleason, 2001) Lastly, I only look at female child mortality to indicate the
effects of reservations on womens’ abilities to pass pro-female policies, but results may
vary with the use of a different proxy variable.

4.3 Discussion: Female Child Mortality and Control Variables
Although the model does not show a significant relationship between women’s
reservations and female child mortality, it does show a relationship with other
independent variables. It is important to control for these variables because they impact
female child mortality. Once they are controlled for, it is easier to see a truer impact of
reservations on female child mortality. Without understanding the relationship between
these variables and the dependent variable, there is no way to have an accurate analysis of
the impact of reservations. According to the literature on the subject, the presence of
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women representatives has increased the self-esteem and confidence of other women and
given them the chance to voice their complaints and ideas. (Chattopadhyay, 2004)
Women often deal with on the grounds issues at the local level and work with NGOs on
topics such as water access, family and matrimonial matters, children’s education, and
land disputes. (Jayal, 2006) Women leaders stress the importance of female education
and raise the aspirations of girls and their parents with a role model effect. (Beaman,
2012) According to the data, increased literacy results in decreased female child mortality
and individual female panchayat members play a large role in the increased education of
the girl child. (Jayal, 2006)
There is also a positive relationship between monthly expenditure per capita,
which can be used as a characteristic of economic growth, and female child mortality.
Economic development overall results in lower women’s status relative to men’s due to
“the undermining of women’s traditional roles or the disproportional increase in men’s
entitlements in relation to women’s.” (Miller, 2001, p.34) Additionally, due to the rise of
sex selective abortion methods in the 1990s, the combination of access to new
technologies and a rise in the wellbeing of households led to increased pre and postnatal
sex discrimination. (Duflo, 2012) This can be shown through the changes in sex ratios at
birth24. For example, a district-level study in Maharashtra found that wealthier districts
such as Mumbai and Pune reported both a larger number of such abortion facilities as
well as more distorted sex ratios than did such poorer districts. (Nagarajan, 2008)
The last two variables of male child mortality and fertility are both also positively
correlated with female child mortality. In terms of fertility, a preference for sons may
result in increased fertility as people attempt to achieve their preference and get rid of
24

Figure 2: Nationwide Trends in Sex Ratio at Birth
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unwanted females through neglect or infanticide. (Sudha, 2003) Male child mortality also
increases slightly as female child mortality increases. This positive relationship goes to
show that areas of low resources for mothers and children may result in high mortality all
around. These can be places with low hospital attendance, lack of healthcare, and few
resources to care for children. (Bhalla, 1995) For example, less than 2.5% of all births in
rural parts of Haryana take place in a hospital and it is also one of the states with high
rates of child mortality. (Bhalla, 1995)

5 State-Level Results and Case Studies
5.1 State-Level Results: Female Child Mortality Rates Before and After Reservations
Specific states had varying levels of changes in female child mortality before and after
reservations. I calculated the average female child mortality rate for each state for the
years before and after reservations were implemented and then analyzed the percent
change in those numbers. The results are summarized in Table 4 for each state.
According to the literature on this topic, Kerala is a state with low child mortality and a
strong emphasis on improving the lives of women. (Sen, 1990) The results show that
Kerala already had a low average female child mortality rate of 5.54 before reservations
and was able to bring it down even further to 2.91, thereby having a 47.5% decrease. This
is the greatest percent improvement out of all of the states.
On the other hand, Haryana is one of the states with a history of high female child
mortality and gender bias. (Sen 2001) The results show that Haryana had a high female
child mortality rate of 27.58 before reservations and only managed to decrease female
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child mortality by 18.5% after reservations. After Bihar, this is the lowest percent change
in female child mortality pre and post reservations.
My analysis is confounded by the fact that with the rise of technology, people
started to move to sex selective abortions, especially in rich communities. This is
important to note when looking at female child mortality because sex selective abortions
may be substituting child mortality, but there is no counter for that in the results. Even if
there is a decrease in child mortality in both states, there may be a rise in female sex
selection, which is outside the purview of this paper but important to keep in mind.

5.2 Case Study: Panchayati Raj in Kerala
Although the national level data does not show a significant relationship between
reservations and female child mortality, the data for each state is less aggregated and
provides more input into the impact of reservations. This thesis has been using the proxy
of female child mortality to analyze political power given to women representatives
because data on policy change at the local level is not readily available. These case
studies give a better perspective on how women are affecting policy change and whether
or not they are successful in reducing female child mortality.
Kerala is located in the southern region of India and is known to be a state with
matriarchal values and relatively less gender bias in comparison to other states. The
government of Kerala passed the Kerala Panchayati Raj Act in 199425, which called for
no less than 33% of seats reserved for women in all levels of local government.
(Chowdhury, 2002) The state has a history of property inheritance through the female
family line as well as a high level of communal medicine, which helps disadvantaged
25

Figure 3: Kerala Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations
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groups such as women have a higher chance of survival. (Sen, 1990) Additionally, the
total literacy campaign run by the state in the late 1980s increased levels of education for
females in all parts of the state and provided them with educational empowerment.
Compared to the rest of India, Kerala has a high level of literacy, better status for women,
and more qualified women representatives. (Sen, 1990) However, this level of education
and status is still low when compared to that of men in Kerala.
After the passage of the Panchayati Raj Act, the government of Kerala passed a
development program called the People’s Campaign for the Ninth Plan. The Plan
Campaign in 1996 brought more women who were usually excluded from political life
into Kerala’s local government bodies and allowed women leaders to implement policies
that impacted pro-female issues such as female child mortality. (M.S., 2002) For the first
time, women were included as partners in the developmental program and not just
beneficiaries. The plan itself called for a greater emphasis on the impact of gender in
policy-making, greater participation of women in Gram Sabha, and at least 10% of the
state budget to go to women’s projects. (M.S., 2002) Two important projects for women
came out of this campaign: one was to organize women in self-help groups (SHGs)
called Kudumbasree and the other was to help rural women and children through the
Angavadies or child care centers. (Women Development, 2003) Kudumbasree was
formally known as the women poverty eradication program, which organized
Neighborhood Groups (NHGs) of women for empowerment and resource provision.
After the rise of the NHGs, there was further decentralization of governance to the subgram sabha level called Ayalkoottam, which gave women more opportunities to interact
in the political sphere. (Chowdhury, 2002)
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In Perambra panchayat, these groups run by women leaders helped other women
move away from agriculture to diversifying their output. The groups also helped women
market their new products in order to economically and socially empower these women
entrepreneurs. (Mathew, 2013) Additionally, in Kanjikuzhy panchayat, the neighborhood
groups helped move women from a dependence on fishing to joining in the production of
umbrellas. This diversification allowed women to not only be financially stable and
independent but empowered them in society, thereby increasing the value of females in
society and helping decrease female child mortality. (Mathew, 2013) Women like
Kanniyamma Sreerangan, the president of a tribal gram panchayat in India, work towards
implementing community-specific projects to further development. Sreerangan began an
initiative to “provide solar panels, batteries, and lights to all 240 families in the
panchayat.”(Shaji, 2014, p.3) She mentioned that before the reservation, her community
was male-dominated and she was discouraged from entering public places such as
meetings of elders to decide on community affairs. Due to political reservations for
women, she claimed that “we, seven women in the panchayat, have started rewriting
history.”(Shaji, 2014, p.4) Her goal was to not only provide her community with the
necessary resources, but to also increase the value of the girl child. Sreerangan and other
like-minded woman panchayat leaders want to create a space where families do not feel
the need to practice female child mortality for social or economic reasons. (Shaji, 2014).
They are also working to improve education and reduce fertility, which are
aforementioned variables that have a relationship with female child mortality rates.
Although Kerala has created a space for women to function and pass policies
through further decentralization and self-help groups, there are still problems remaining
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in the state. There has never been more than 10% women in the state assembly and many
of these women are of an elite class and cannot understand the problems of rural women.
(Chowdhury, 2002) The results of a 2002 survey in Kerala panchayats showed that only
“16% report that they have to deal with women’s issues, 9% deal with children’s issues,
and 10% say that they felt supported by their male colleagues.” (Chowdhury, 2002, p.14)
The support system for women in government needs improvement and women need to be
equipped with the right skills and training. Additionally, many elected women
representatives are not informed about panchayat meetings and are barred from taking up
women’s issues by their political party. (Chowdhury, 2002) Political parties are
responsible for fielding candidates and can informally control their candidate’s policymaking or preferences in order to be in line with their own platform. (Chowdhury, 2002)
Due to the development program and self-help groups, women in Kerala are given more
resources and political freedom than their counterparts in other Indian states. This results
in a decrease in female child mortality but does not mean that they share equality with
men in the political sphere. If they attempt to leave their gender roles in order to enter
politics, they are often met with much of the same ridicule, bias, and stereotypes that
women in other parts of India face.

5.3 Case Study: Panchayati Raj in Haryana
Unlike Kerala, the state of Haryana has a highly patriarchal history where men control
both the public and private spheres. It is one of the richest states in India, yet trickledown economics does not work and there is great inequality between sexes and classes.
(Sen, 1990) During the last census in 2011, Haryana had the lowest child sex ratio at 834
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females per 1000 males. (Jejeebhoy, 2015) The data in the model also shows that
reservations led to less than 20% decrease in average female child mortality, which is a
much smaller difference than in most other states26.
Several previous studies have found constraints on women representatives in
Haryana that have impeded their progress in policymaking and reducing gender bias. A
study by Rekha Chaudhary “revealed that most of the elected women representatives
have not been empowered because of a lack of education, awareness, and confidence.”
(Lohumi, 2013, p.35) Due to this lack of empowerment, they have not been able to
change the status quo and decrease the prevalence of female feticide and infanticide. The
Buch study concluded that out of the women representatives surveyed in Haryana, “40
percent of the women representatives belonged to families with incomes that place them
below the poverty line; 14.2 percent of them were landless, 19.5 percent had marginal
holdings and 20.6 percent had small farm holdings.” (Buch, 1999, p. 23) Many of these
women are poor and lack the financial flexibility to spend their time and energy on
politics. Additionally, many of the women’s election campaigns are run by the men of
their family and allow for the empowerment of those men instead of the intended women.
These women are neither economically nor politically empowered and lack the support
and training needed to succeed in their positions. (Jayal, 2006) Lastly, in a survey by
Chander, Kumari, and Singh, 33.13% of the elected women members did not have full
information about the Panchayat budget and how it could be used, which indicates the
severe lack of information given to women leaders in their positions. (Chander, 2013)
There are also administrative and institutional problems with Haryana’s
Panchayati Raj that act as constraints on women’s power. In many of the villages in
26

Figure 4: Haryana Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations
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Haryana, male members elect women to reserved seats instead of hosting democratic
elections. (M.S., 2000) In these cases, the true policymaking power lies with the men
who control the women figureheads. Another major problem is the two child norm that
does not allow women with more than two children to enter into politics, thereby limiting
many women from participating and perpetuating female child mortality. (Buch, 2006)
There is a lack of true decentralization from the state to the local level and many
panchayat leaders believe that they have no power due to the state’s institutional
constraints. (Jayal, 2006)
A study by Surat Singh from the Haryana Institute of Rural Development found
that women in Haryana panchayats were not able to make a significant impact on
policymaking and the male-dominated status quo remained. (Singh, 2013) Women also
were not able to levy taxes or raise funds for projects due to the steadfast reluctance of
men to share any power. (Singh, 2013) Singh concludes that many women
representatives in panchayats have been able to gain status, but not concrete power to
effectively implement their policy preferences. (Singh, 2013) Another reason for
women’s lack of power is the age-old tradition of unelected all-male village councils
called khap panchayats who hold de facto lawmaking power. In an interview, a member
of one of largest khaps, Raghuvir Nain, said, “Not once has the decision of the khap been
overridden in this village. If anyone wants to challenge a decision they are free to go to
the courts in this country. India’s judicial system is notoriously slow and prone to
corruption, so for many, the khap system is the only solution.” (Kumar, 2012, p.3)
Haryana has failed to pass or change policies to stop these khaps from gaining power and
they continue to perpetuate gender bias and discrimination by denying rape charges and
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forcing women to practice purdah27. (Kumar, 2012) Women’s lack of power in Haryana
may be one of the reasons for high female child mortality. A study by George and
Dahiya, 1998, concluded that “41 percent of the female early neonatal deaths are due to
direct female infanticide and excess female child mortality is caused by indirect
infanticide and neglect.” (George, 1998, p.14) This is especially bad in upper classes
where a sex ratio of 1.27 from 1993-1998 meant that 16.8% of female fetuses were
aborted at that time. (George, 1998)
The state of Haryana has attempted to reduce female child mortality through
various schemes and policies, but due to ongoing cultural and institutional constraints on
women politicians, these policies have not had a significant impact. Even policies such as
the 2015 Haryana Panchayati Raj Ordinance, which was meant to emphasize women’s
education, result in increasing male power due to the state’s deeply ingrained patriarchal
society. The ordinance requires that only educated candidates contest in panchayat
elections and therefore attempts to place more value on women’s education. (Sehgal,
2015) However, this backfired when men began to marry educated women to control as
figureheads in reserved positions. Additionally, besides educational qualifications, the
ordinance requires candidates to prove payment of electricity bills, not have any bank
loans, and have a working toilet. (Sehgal, 2015) These requirements make it hard for
women without training or financial assets to compete in elections and further
disempower them. Other ineffective initiatives by the state include cash transfer programs
to stop female child mortality. The state passed the Apni Beti Apna Dhan initiative in
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The practice among women in certain Muslim and Hindu societies of living in a separate room or behind
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News, 2017).
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1994 where poor families receive 25,000 rupees if they educate their daughters and do
not marry them off before their 18th birthdays. (Jejeebhoy, 2015) The Devirupak Scheme
was passed in 2002 and provides cash transfers for families that choose to get sterilized
after their first child. (Kalsi, 2017) Lastly, the Ladli Scheme was passed in 2005 and
provides money for second girl children born after 2005. (Jejeebhoy, 2015) A serious
flaw that makes all of these programs highly ineffective is that they target only lowerincome households, while higher-income households are the ones practicing female child
mortality to a greater extent. (Miller, 2001) Upper-class families in Haryana are the ones
with high rates of feticide and infanticide and the programs do not target these families.
(Miller, 2001) A 2001 study in Haryana found that the sex ratio at birth for upper caste
women was 127 males for 100 females, compared with 102 with lower caste women.
(Miller, 2001) While cash transfers successfully improve school enrollment and
immunization rates for girls, they do not directly address parent’s demand for sons and
gender-biased discrimination. The combination of women’s lack of political power and
ineffective programs results in an unbalanced juvenile sex ratio in Haryana and the
continued prevalence of female child mortality.

6. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that simply descriptive representation in India does not provide
women with the capacity to advocate for pro-female issues such as female child
mortality. There is a relationship between an increase in women representatives and their
preferences towards helping women and children, but they are constrained by social,
economic, and political impediments. In order for women to have substantive
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representation and see policy outcomes, they must be given equal standing in politics and
society and be provided with the training and skills needed to excel in their positions.
I analyze the effects of political reservations of women on female child mortality
using data from the Panchayati Raj amendment in India. The variable of female child
mortality is a proxy for the substantive representation of women office-holders and their
ability to administer pro-female programs and policies. I find that having a political
representation of women at the local level does not have a significant relationship with
female child mortality rates at the national level. In order to analyze policy
implementation at the state level, I conducted case studies of Kerala, a state where
reservations made a large impact on average female child mortality and Haryana, where
reservations did not have a big impact. Kerala was successful in reducing female child
mortality through decentralization to developmental programs and self-help groups run
by women. This resulted in women being able to administer their own programs and
pursue their policy preferences. On the other hand, women in Haryana were severely
restricted in policy implementation and schemes to reduce child mortality were only
targeted towards the poor and ignored the upper classes. Understanding the limitations of
simply adding a number of women to local government without empowerment is an
important first step in determining women’s potential and actual impact on decisionmaking. The representation of women should be approached in a holistic manner in order
for them to be able to pass pro-female policies that will improve human development
indicators such as female child mortality. Even when such policies are passed, women
must have the power to implement and fund their policy preferences in order for them to
be effective.
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Appendix: Data Sources

A Series: General Population Tables, published by the Office of the Registrar
General & Census Commissioner, India.
Birth Rate, Death Rate, Natural Growth Rate, Infant Mortality Rate & Total Fertility
Rate by Residence for States/UTs (1972 to 2011), published by Planning
Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.
Causes of Death Statistics: Sample Registration System, published by the Office of
the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India.
Compendium of India’s Fertility and Mortality Indicators, 1971-2013: Sample
Registration System, published by the Office of the Registrar General & Census
Commissioner, India.
C Series: Social and Cultural Tables, published by the Office of the Registrar
General & Census Commissioner, India.
DLHS Household Survey: Health Management Information System, published by
the National Health Mission of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India.
Economic Surveys of India (1987-2007): Union Budget and Economic Survey,
Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
Elementary Education in India: Progress Towards UEE, published by the National
University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi.
F Series: Fertility Tables, published by the Office of the Registrar General & Census
Commissioner, India.
Gross State Domestic Product at Constant 2004-05 Prices and % Growth YoY (2004-05
to 2013-14), published by Planning Commission, Government of India, New
Delhi.
India- Macro- economic Summary: 1990-00 to 2014-15, published by Planning
Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.
India: Data, The World Bank Group.
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Infant Mortality Rates for States & UTs-Male, Female, & Total (1961, 2006, 2008,
2011, 2012), published by Planning Commission, Government of India, New
Delhi.
National Family Health Survey, 2016: Health Management Information System,
published by the National Health Mission of Health & Family Welfare,
Government of India.
State-wise Gini Co-efficient of Distribution of Consumption (73 to 11): published
by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.
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Table 1
Dates of Panchayati Raj Implementation Across States in India

States

Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal

Year of
Reservation

1995
2000
2001
1995
1994
1993
1995
1994
1992
1992
1998
1995
1996
1995
1993
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Table 2: Summary Statistics

Demographic
& Economic
control
variables
(1987-2007)
Population
GDP
Literacy Rates
Female Chief
Minister
Average
MPCE
(rupees)
Fertility28
Birth Rate29
Male Infant
Mortality30

Obs

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

315
315
315

57341172
93303
61

33762492
85583
13

14591108
4685
35

186755000
594832
93

315

0

0

0

1

315
315
315

569
3
27

296
1
18

162
2
15

1666
6
328

315

66

24

9

137

315

23

10

2

2

315

68

24

9

128

315

8

2

5

15

Female Sex
Selection Data
Female Child
Mortality 31
Female Infant
Mortality32
Female Death
Rate33

28
29

30
31

32
33

Number of children born per woman per year (x 1000)
Number of live births during the year per mid-year population (x 1000)
Number of male infant deaths during the year per number of male live births (x 1000)
Number of female deaths per mid-year female population of children age 0-4 (x 1000)
Number of female infant deaths during the year per number of female live births (x 1000)
Number of female deaths during the year Per mid-year population (x 1000)
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Table 3
Women’s Political Reservations and Female Child Mortality in India

Female Child Mortality
Reservation
Population
Literacy
MPCE
Female Chief
Minister
Fertility
Male Infant Mortality

State Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect

R- Squared
Number of
observations

•
•
•

•

0.212
[0.383]
***-0.0000000921
[2.39e-08]
***-0.248
[0.049]
***0.00265
[0.00079]
-0.459
[0.434]
***1.955
[0.768]
***0.2603
[0.183]

X
X

0.858
315

Numbers in brackets indicate the standard deviation of the variable
*, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Regression for 15 major states and years 1987-2007. Each cell represents the
coefficient on the post-reform dummy for the outcome variables. Post-reform
dummy equals 1 for years after the first local government elections with
reservations for women.
Includes state and fixed year effects
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Table 4
Women’s Political Reservations and Female Child Mortality by States of India

PreReservation
Average
Female
Child
Mortality

State
Andhra
Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Gujarat
Haryana
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
•
•
•
•

Post
Reservation
Average
Female Child
Mortality

Percent
Difference Change (%)

22.72
29.08
30.82
28.19
27.58
23.86
5.54

16.18
21.22
29.81
19.51
22.49
16.31
2.91

6.54
7.86
1.01
8.68
5.09
7.54
2.63

28.79
27.03
3.27
30.79
18.46
31.62
47.51

47.56
19.45
41.85
20.56
36.69
18.08
44.11
22.40

31.56
12.14
27.47
15.36
27.56
11.26
29.66
14.21

16.00
7.31
14.39
5.20
9.12
6.83
14.45
8.19

33.65
37.59
34.37
25.29
24.87
37.76
32.75
36.58

Number of female deaths per mid year female population of children ages 0-4
(x 1000)
Demographic & economic controls include GDP, literacy, monthly per capita
expenditure, presence of a female chief minister, fertility, and male infant
mortality
*, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Figure 1
Nationwide Trends in Female Child Mortality (1987-2007)
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Figure 2:
Nationwide Trends in Sex Ratio at Birth (1999-2012)

Sex Ratio (females per 1000 males) by
Birth
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Figure 3:
Kerala Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations

Female Child Mortality per mid year
population of females age 0-4
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12

Years Since Women’s Reservations

Notes: Each point on the graph represents the impact of women's representation on female child mortality
after a given number of years. The zero point on the X-axis represents the year of the reform; the dates of
reform vary across states as documented in Table 1.
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Figure 4:
Haryana Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations
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Notes: Each point on the graph represents the impact of women's representation on female child mortality
after a given number of years. The zero point on the X-axis represents the year of the reform; the dates of
reform vary across states as documented in Table 1.

